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“Restoration, Modification and Heating Maintenance  
Practice for a 4 Meter Double Divided Underjet Coke  
Battery”

Undated

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RESTORATION, MODIFICATION AND  
HEATING MAINTENANCE PRACTICE  
FOR A 4 METER DOUBLE DIVIDED  
UNDERTET COKE BATTERY

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History -

ACME STEEL CURRENTLY OPERATES TWO 1957 VINTAGE 50 OVEN WILLPUTTE DOUBLE DIVIDED UNDERJET COKE OVEN BATTERIES. THESE BATTERIES HAVE UTILIZED COKE OVEN GAS AS FUEL SINCE THE LATE 60'S -

IN 1978 BOTH BATTERIES UNDERWENT THRU WALL REPAIRS - ORIGINAL REGENERATORS WERE LEFT INTACT AS WELL AS SUSPENDING THE ORIGINAL BRICKWORK ABOVE THE OVEN CHAMBER, OR "HANGING THE ROOF" AS IT'S COMMONLY CALLED. UNDERFIRE SYSTEM WAS VIRTUALLY LEFT INTACT ALTHOUGH REVERSING COCKS AND METERING ORIFACES WERE RECONDITIONED ON A AS NEEDED BASIS -

ACME CONTINUED TO RESUME NORMAL OPERATION OF THE BATTERIES WELL THRU THE 80'S UNTIL LATE 1989 -

UNDERFIRE SYSTEM RESTORATION AND MODIFICATION -

IN LATE 1989, RELATED TO AN OBVIOUS GAS SUPPLY MAIN RESTRICTION BOTH BATTERIES 24" FUEL GAS MAINS WERE BURGED AND OPENED FOR CLEANING - AS SUSPECTED HEAVY



(2)

COKE OVEN DEPOSITS WERE FOUND TO BE RESTRICTING GAS FLOW ACROSS THE LENGTHS OF BOTH MAINS. - IN ORDER TO FACILITATE CLEANING IT WAS NECESSARY TO CUT 10" X 18" SECTIONS FROM THE UPPER CIRCUMFERENCE OF THE MAINS. - DEPOSITS WERE REMOVED AND THE 10" X 18" PANELS WERE ~~RE~~WELDED BACK INTO POSITION

IT WAS THIS CLEANING WHICH LITERALLY "BROUGHT TO LIGHT" THE TOLL ADVANCED CORROSION HAD TAKEN. - WITH DEPOSITS REMOVED SEVERAL LOWER <sup>CIRCUMFERENCE</sup> AREAS DEMONSTRATED THE ABSENCE OF METAL, AND MANY AREAS WERE FOUND TO BE DANGEROUSLY THIN.

PROBLEM AREAS WERE ENCASED IN FIBERGLASS UNTIL <sup>MORE</sup> PERMANENT REPAIRS COULD BE EFFECTED.

AFTER ANALYZING SEVERAL POSSIBLE REPLACEMENT SCENARIOS, IT WAS DECIDED THAT THE <sup>BEST</sup> METHOD WHICH MET ALL COST, SAFETY AND BATTERY PRESERVATION <sup>CONSTRAINTS</sup> WOULD BE TO CONVERT THE EXISTING 10" DECARB AIR MAIN FOR GAS SERVICE - REMOVE AND REPLACE THE 24" MAIN, LOWER PIPING AND EMERGENCY COCKS - THEN RESTORE THE 24" MAIN TO SERVICE. AT THIS POINT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE MAINS WERE SCHEDULED FOR REPLACEMENT ONE BATTERY AT A TIME. - EIGHT EIGHT HOUR OUTAGES WERE ALLOCATED FOR EACH BATTERY.



BRANDED STAINLESS STEEL

CHANGING RUBBER HOSES TO

PREPARATORY WORK CONSISTED OF CLEANING AND INSPECTING THE 10" DECARB MAIN, BLIND FLANGING THE BLOWER INLET SIDE, FABRICATION OF A 10" EXTENSION FROM THE PRE HEATERS TO THE MAIN, ALONG WITH THE INSTALLATION OF A 10" AIR ACTUATED REGULATION VALVE.— IN ORDER TO AVOID HAVING TO CHANGE OR MODIFY THE REVERSING LINKAGE CONNECTIONS FROM THE 10" MAIN WERE MADE DIRECTLY TO THE BOTTOM OF THE REVERSING COCKS, WHICH UTILIZED THE EXISTING STRUCTURAL SUPPORT COLUMNS.— AIR FOR FLUE DECARBONIZATION WAS PROVIDED BY DRAFTING THRU THE REVERSING COCK CLEAN OUT PORTS.

ARME'S SAFETY POLICY PROHIBITS THE USE OF ANY SPARK GENERATING DEVICES IN THE UNDERFIRE BASEMENT WHILE THE MAINS ARE IN SERVICE. THIS REQUIRED EACH MAIN TO BE PURGED PRIOR TO WORK BEGINNING. "SHUT DOWN MEETINGS WERE SCHEDULED WELL IN ADVANCE WITH CONTRACTORS, OPERATORS, IN HOUSE MAINTENANCE AND ARME SAFETY DEPT. PERSONNEL IN ATTENDANCE. MEETINGS WERE ALSO HELD AFTER EACH OUTAGE TO DISCUSS ANY PROBLEMS WHICH HAD ARISEN DURING THE PROCESS.

DURING THE INITIAL OUTAGE FOR EACH BATTERY AFTER MAIN PURGING, THE REVERSING COCKS WERE CUT FROM THE 24" MAIN AND



CONNECTED TO THE 10" MAIN VIA THE STAINLESS STEEL BRAIDED HOSE WITH THE INCLUSION OF BALL VALVES TO ALLOW INDIVIDUAL HEADER CONTROL. SIMULTANEOUSLY WORK WAS INITIATED TO INSTALL THE 10" FABRICATED CONNECTION FROM THE PREHEATER TO THE 10" CONVERTED MAIN.

ADHERENCE TO THE STRICT 8 HOUR GAS OFF CRITERIA FORCED US TO EXERCISE A CONTINGENCY PLAN. ONLY 1/2 THE BATTERIES CONNECTIONS COULD BE MADE SO THAT WE PROCEEDED TO PURGE AIR FROM BOTH MAINS AND PLACE THE 24" AND 10" MAIN INTO GAS SERVICE SIMULTANEOUSLY, AND ONCE AGAIN RESUME OPERATION.

EACH MAIN MAINTAINED ITS OWN REGULATOR. PRESSURE IN THE 24" MAIN WAS REGULATED AT 50mm WATER COLUMN WITH THE 10" MAIN BEING REGULATED AT 500mm.

ALTHOUGH FLOW METERS WERE INACCURATE IT WAS POSSIBLE TO MAINTAIN A 100 OVEN SETPOINT (24 TONS COKE) AT A BATTERY AVERAGE OF 2260 F°.

DURING THE SECOND OUTAGE THE REMAINING COCKS WERE CUT FROM THE 24" MAIN AND DEMOLITION OF THE 24" MAIN WAS BEGUN.

PNEUMATIC SAWS WERE UTILIZED TO CUT THE MAIN INTO 13 FT SECTIONS.—



(5)

A SECTION OF THE WALL SEPARATING THE BASEMENT FROM THE COMBUSTION AIR TUNNEL WAS REMOVED TO ALLOW THE SECTIONS TO BE DOLLIED OUT PAST THE BATTERY SUPPORT COLUMNS - INTO THE AIR TUNNEL THEN OUT AT THE BATTERY ENDS -  
AFTER PURGE THE ENTIRE BATTERY WAS NOW BEING SUPPLIED BY THE CONNECTED 10" MAIN. GAS PRESSURE WAS REGULATED AT 600mmwc, WITH INDIVIDUAL HEADERS MANUALLY ADJUSTED BY THE NEWLY INSTALLED BALL VALVES. - 40-45mmwc WAS THE TARGET PRESSURE.

NEW 24" MAIN SECTIONS FABRICATED IN 13' FT SECTIONS FROM ASTM A53 STEEL PIPE, PRE COATED WITH AN EPOXY COATING. SUCCEEDING OUTAGES EACH SECTION WAS WELDED INTO PLACE - COMPLETE EXTERIAL CIRCUMFERENCE WELDING WITH THE INSIDE BOTTOM RECEIVING ADDITIONAL WELD. ALL INTERIOR WELDED AREAS WERE PRIMED AND RECOATED TO 20 MILS WITH EPOXY -

THIS NEW MAIN INCORPORATED SEVERAL MODIFICATIONS - 13 CLEAN OUT PORTS WERE LOCATED ON THE UPPER CIRCUMFERENCE. EACH PORT MEASURES 14" X 20" AND ARE SPACED 14 FEET APART. IN ORDER TO MINIMIZE PIPE LOSS DUE TO EXPANSION AND



(6)

CONTRACTION MOVEMENT THE MAIN WAS  
SEATED ON A SHEET OF TEFLON.

BOTH MAINS AFTER THE SCHEDULED  
16 REQUIRED OUTAGES WERE PLACED INTO FULL GAS  
SERVICE —

BASED ON ULTRASONIC TESTS CONDUCTED ACROSS  
BOTH BATTERIES, <sup>WHOLESALE</sup> HEADER AND ANCILLARY PIPE  
REPLACEMENT WERE FOUND TO BE UNNECESSARY AT THIS TIME  
(TABLE 1) 24 INNER HEADERS AND 26 OUTER  
HEADERS WERE IDENTIFIED AS BEING AT OR  
AROUND MIN. ASTM SPEC FOR GAS SERVICE.

PREFABRICATED 3" HEADERS (IN TWO SECTIONS)  
WERE MOVED INTO THE BATTERY BASEMENT. MAINS  
WERE PURGED AND HEADERS WERE WELDED TOGETHER.  
MAINS WERE RESTORED TO GAS SERVICE AND  
INDIVIDUAL HEADERS WERE REPAIRED VIA  
ISOLATION AT THE EMERGENCY COCKS.  
REMAINING ORIFICES WERE INSTALLED  
AS THESE HEADERS WERE REPAIRED.

SUCCESSIVE ULTRASONIC SURVEYS  
CONDUCTED IN LATE 1994 REVEALED THAT  
A VAST MAJORITY OF THE EXISTING HEADERS  
HAD BECOME SUBJECTED TO ACCELERATED  
CORROSIVE PIPE LOSS. —

PLANS WERE LAID OUT TO EXECUTE  
WHOLESALE HEADER CHANGES. ONCE AGAIN  
HEADERS WERE PREFABRICATED IN TWO SECTIONS AND  
LAID OUT IN THE BASEMENT. ST OPERATIONAL



OUTAGES WERE <sup>REQUIRED</sup> REQUIRED TO WELD SECTIONS TOGETHER. UNFORTUNATELY ONLY ENOUGH HEADERS COULD BE WELDED DURING AN OUTAGE TO REPLACE 13 COMPLETE WALLS - SO ADHERENCE TO OUR SHAR OUTAGE POLICY FORCED US TO SPREAD OUT REPLACEMENT. USING THE ULTRASONIC SURVEY AS A BASIS FOR HEADER REPLACEMENT, HEADERS INITIALLY COULD NOT BE CHANGED SEQUENTIALLY - WE PRIORITIZED ACCORDING TO ~~THE~~ DETRIORATION AND FOUND US REPAIRING HEADERS AT VARIOUS LOCATIONS ACROSS BOTH BATTERIES -

IT WAS ALSO NOTED AT THIS TIME THAT ACME BEGAN TO ENCOUNTER DIFFICULTIES WITH THE REVERSING COCK CORES - THE LUBRICATION SYSTEM PROVIDED WITH THE ORIGINAL INSTALLATION HAD LONG BEEN ABANDONED. ~~HAD~~ GREASING HAD BEEN FILLING THE BILL ALTHOUGH THE ORGANIC BASED PRODUCT UTILIZED SEEMED TO BE SOLIDIFYING PREMATURELY. THIS CONDITION NOT ONLY SUBJECTED CORES TO MINI EXPLOSIONS SOON AFTER REVERSE BUT WAS SUBJECTING THEM TO PREMATURE WEAR & SCORING - ADDING TO THE LACK OF A "GOOD" SEAL IN THIS AREA -

THIS NECESSITATED NOT ONLY HEADER/OILFACE REPLACEMENT, BUT REVERSING COCK RECONDITIONING AND REPLACEMENT AS WELL, NOT TO MENTION THE LABOR INTENSIVE ~~PROCESS~~ OF STRIPPING CORES, CLEANING REGREASING AND ~~ITS~~ INSTALLATION -



Finally after a process spread out over several years - ACME had in operation an underfire gas supply pipe system which was completely reconditioned. Unfortunately recent ultrasonic testing indicated that the new system will most likely not survive as long as the original installation. (TABLE 2) Buyer Restraints enforced since Sept 1991 seem to have negatively impacted the efficiency of our By Products ability to Clean Gas.

This in turn has led to an accelerated corrosion rate approximately 40% higher than that measured in the period of 1957-1993.

In fact it has become necessary to replace several headers at the remote ends of the gas supply network after only several years of service.

Several important modifications ARE PAYING CURRENT DIVIDENDS -

① #1 BATTERY FUEL GAS MAIN WAS OPENED FOR INSPECTION IN MID 1996. - WHILE THE EXCERBERATED CORROSION RATE IS APPARENT IN THE HEADERS THE FUEL GAS MAIN IS IN EXCEPTIONAL CONDITION - THE EPOXY COATING REMAINS INTACT WITH NO EVIDENCE OF CORROSIVE DETERIORATION

(the modified inspection ports provided easy access at all points)

② #1 BATTERY REVERSING COCKS ARE CURRENTLY



BEING LUBRICATED WITH A SYNTHETIC BASED GREASE WHICH SEEMS IMPERVIOUS TO CHEMICAL ATTACK - THIS HAS DRASTICALLY EXTENDED THE FREQUENCY AT WHICH A COCK HAS TO BE REMOVED FROM THE COCK - CLEANED, REGRINDED AND REINSTALLED - NOT A SINGLE COCK LUBRICATED WITH THIS SYNTHETIC HAS EXPERIENCED POPPING -

③ NEW REVERSING COCKS WERE CAST WITH SLIGHT MODIFICATIONS TO THE ORIGINAL GARAGE GROOVES - A SLIGHTLY MODIFIED CHAMFERED GROOVE SEEMS TO PROVIDE THE BEST OVERALL COVERAGE ALTHOUGH TESTING CONTINUES -

④ GAS HEADER FABRICATION HAS BEEN MODIFIED TO PROVIDE A 3" FLANGED CONNECTION AT THE POINT ORIGINALLY REQUIRING A WELD - HEADERS CAN NOW BE REPLACED WITH OUT A SHUT DOWN OR PURGE BY ISOLATION AT THE HEADER EMERGENCY COCK -

HEATING MAINTENANCE PRACTICE

AS EQUALLY IMPORTANT AS THE APPARATUS TO SUPPLY GAS AND AIR TO THE BLUE ACES THE BASIC HOUSEKEEPING REQUIREMENTS TO KEEP THE SYSTEM IN WORKING ORDER. (EXHIBIT 1) AS EVIDENCED BY A PAGE FOR ACME'S WORK INSTRUCTION - Heaters are changed



with the responsibilities to take flue temperatures every shift on every wall plus 4 complete crosswalls per turn. Heaters are also responsible to watch 5 overs per battery as they are pushed to identify any localized heating problems —

(EXHIBIT 2) Weekly Heater Work Responsibility Forms are used as a guide and to document housekeeping activities — All critical heating components are addressed — (EXHIBIT 3) Additional heater responsibilities include reversing machine emergency back up testing — waste heat dampers + valves — Air Boxes and Air Filters —

(EXHIBIT 4) To further enhance communications between the Heating Dept. and Operations Shift Managers we've recently require documentation of the heaters responsibilities — this report is basically designed to give ~~the~~ operational shift manager information which aids him in identifying a potential "green push" which may be related to a heating maintenance activity —

Some of these activities are "day" specific but overall the heater is given latitude as long as the weekly requirement is met —

Historically this program has been adequate to meet most requirements — The crosswall heat distribution is excellent — and further verification is demonstrated by an acceptable oven to oven heating variation.



However Following ACME'S Quality Policy of continuous process improvement does not allow us to be <sup>1st</sup> adequate. While the heating operation remained basically solid there were specific problem areas which had developed, generally as a result of the "to the roof thruway" and/or thru the loss of some basic practices as our workforce, thru retirements became less experienced.

Several localized problems were thought to be originating in the regenerator area. Individual outer zone regenerators were opened and inspected. Cleaning, which in most cases involved removal of the top course of checker brick was ~~per~~ performed where required. Only a handful of regenerator division walls were found to require repair. These were wet sprayed to seal cross leakage. Overall <sup>outer</sup> regenerators were found to be in acceptable condition.

In conjunction with the <sup>outer</sup> regenerator inspections it was deemed necessary to inspect the bus flues as well - Outer bus flue inspection ports were opened and explored, with no significant buildup found. - A mirror on a



"stick" apparatus was rigged in order to see the roof of the outer bus flue for inspection of the Wellquitts designed venturi brick at the base of the regenerators - Appox 20% of the venturis inspected were found to be restricted. Although material could not be collected for ANALYSIS, it was possible to design an apparatus to deliver compressed air to each venturi brick and blow the restricting material up into the checked brick - While primitive, this procedure is effective for inspecting & clearing outer <sup>zone</sup> venturi ports.

Inner regenerators are quite another story. It is impossible to inspect inner zone regenerators on a double divided battery without removing brick - all major undertaking.

Brainstorming in house produced a device to allow Heating personnel to feed a "heat proofed" video cam into the inner bus flue and record the conditions of the inner zone venturi ports. It was also possible to see the checked support brick thru the venturis. Not quite a full regenerator inspection,



but the next best thing short of tearing out regenerator division walls or oven walls and flues. A lance was fabricated to blow out restricted venturis as required.

~~These intensive efforts had provided~~  
In order to take additional proactive steps to improve our heating program it became NECESSARY to <sup>REQUIRE</sup> SERVICES OF ~~SUPPLEMENTAL~~ CONSULTATION —  
Additional →

AREAS WERE IDENTIFIED TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL FINE TUNING. ~~WERE NOTED AND CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN.~~

- ① EXCESSIVE STACK DRAFT
- ② ERROR IN BASEMENT PRESSURE REGULATION REFERENCE POINT
- ③ INDIVIDUAL FLUE CONDITIONS —

IT HAD BEEN ACME'S OPINION THAT THE EXCESSIVE STACK DRAFT <sup>CARRIED</sup> WAS PROVIDING THE NECESSARY EXCESS OXYGEN (7-9%) TO BURN OFF SUSPECTED LEAKAGE FROM THE OVEN CHAMBER AT THE JOINT WHERE THE "SUSPENDED ROOF" HAD BEEN JOINED TO THE NEW THRU WALLS IN 1978. WHILE THE "SMOKING STACK" CONDITION WAS ALLEVIATED ~~THE~~ SYSTEM WAS BEING THREATENED RATHER THAN <sup>THE</sup> DISEASE —



(FIG 1)

By conducting a complete blue gas on/ gas off survey it was ascertained that

(FIG 2)

the combustion stack was demonstrating the results of poor combustion relating to the condition of air ports and positioning of slide brick rather than crosswall leakage —

(FIG 3)

(FIG 4)

Additional manpower and resources were allocated to rectify these conditions. At the direction of our consultant we fabricated specially designed lances and bars to remove carbon deposits from the gas risers, air ports and slide bricks

Over the years it became standard winterization practice to close and seal alleyway louvers. This offered the advantage of preheating air being drawn into the underfire basement.

Having done a superior job of sealing these louvers had the undesired effect of lowering the pressure in the battery control room <sup>to -15 mmwc</sup> which housed the reference point for basement pressure regulation. — Consequently basement pressure would actually be -20 mmwc rather than our target of -0.5 mmwc.







(16)

slide back.

We also addressed the problem of instrument reference point. ~~Unknown~~ During the course of winterization it was our policy to close & seal all louvers on both the C/S and P/S ALBYS — THIS offered us the advantage of somewhat preheating AMBIENT AIR AS IT WAS DRAWN THRU the ALBYS INTO the BASEMENT AIR COMBUSTION TUNNEL — UNBETWOONST TO US, HAVING DONE A SUPERIOR JOB OF SEALING THESE LOUVERS, WE HAD ACTUALLY LOWERED the PRESSURE IN the BATTERY CONTROL ROOM (WHERE our BASEMENT PRESSURE REGULATION INSTRUMENTS ARE REFERENCED) TO BE 1.5 MMK lower than Atmospheric AND CONSEQUENTLY BSMT PRESSURE TO BE -2.0 RATHER THAN -0.5 MMK AS THOUGHT — THIS COMBINED WITH AN ALREADY HIGH STACK DRAFT CREATED A SITUATION WHERE TOP FINE PRESSURE WOULD RUN NEGATIVE THEREBY CREATING A SNOWBALL EFFECT OF WHICH the NET RESULT WAS FOUling OF FLUE AIR POTS AND DEBRIS INFILTRATION WHEN FLUE CAPS WERE REMOVED TO TAKE TEMPERATURE —

THIS SOLUTION WAS TO (A) CLEAN ALL RESTRICTIONS (B) RUN A 3/8" IMPULSE LINE OUT OF the BATTERY TO DIRECTLY



Reference Atmospheric pressure -

As a result of this - ~~BASEMENT~~ <sup>Pressure</sup> WAS INCREASED TO @ -1.0mmk - excess O<sub>2</sub> CONTROLLER PERFORMS ADJUSTMENT TO REDUCE STACK DRAFT AND FLUE PRESSURES WERE INCREASED TO BE JUST SLIGHTLY POSITIVE -

With the Flue/Air ~~Fit~~ PROGRAM COMPLETE - BUT PRESSURE CONTROLLER REFERENCED TO ATMOSPHERIC - WE PROCEEDED TO BALANCE THE DRAFT ON INDIVIDUAL WALLS - THIS IS A TEDIIOUS PROCESS WHICH INVOLVES SETTING THE DRAFT DAMPERS (QUADRANTS) ON EACH INDIVIDUAL WALL. WE STARTED AT THE WASTE HEAT OFFTAKES TO THE STACK - SET 5 WALLS IN EACH DIRECTION - VISUAL ~~OBSERVATIONS AND MEASUREMENT~~ OF FLUE PRESSURE ~~AND~~ COMBINED WITH VISUAL OBSERVATIONS OF COMBUSTION - DETERMINED DRAFT DEMAND FOR EACH WALL -

~~With the~~ <sup>With the</sup> CULMINATION OF THESE EFFORTS WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO ~~RESOLVE SEVERAL PROBLEMS~~ -

- ① consistently run with excess O<sub>2</sub> in the range of 5-5.5% - maintain a slightly positive flue pressure and also experience a minimal amount of soot emissions -



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In conclusion, in view of ever tightening  
government regulation, Daily Method 303  
inspection, weekly method 9 A TO Stack  
AND PUSH READING not to mention the  
ALL KNOWING AND ALL SEEING "PUBLIC"  
WE AS COKE OVEN OPERATORS HAVE <sup>LITTLE OR</sup> NO  
MARGIN FOR ERROR. WE MUST CONTINUE  
TO EXHIBIT THE BASICS AND STRIVE TO  
IMPROVE OUR CONTROL AND UNDERSTANDING



(1)

## Introduction

Acme Steel currently operates two 1957 vintage <sup>50 over</sup> Wellputte double divided underfire coke batteries. Batteries have been fired strictly on coke over gas since the late 60's -

In 1978 we "hung our roofs" and did thru wall repairs to all 100 oven chambers - Work on the battery underfire system <sup>at this time</sup> was limited to reconditioning of the reversing cochs and metering outlets -

By the early 80's our fuel gas mains began to exhibit signs of advanced corrosion - In 1983 both batteries had their Dressler expansion joints replaced - As an added precaution we wrapped the joints & outside diameter with  $\frac{1}{2}$  inch of fiberglass - ~~The mains~~ ~~were cleaned~~ Main deposits were only removed as far into the mains as could be reached with shovels and bars -

In 1989 <sup>By necessity</sup> fuel gas mains were purged & cleaned. In order to facilitate cleaning we cut 10" x 18" sections from the upper portion of the pipe - Deposits were removed, ~~and~~ the patches were rewelded in original position -



(2)

It was this cleaning which literally "brought to light" the extent of ADVANCED CORROSION we had incurred - With deposits removed several areas demonstrated the absence of metal altogether and many areas (especially the main bottom) were found to be dangerously thin - Deteriorated sections were fiberglassed as a temporary repair, while our engineers and operators developed a plan to restore the underfire system beginning with the fuel gas main -

~~By mid 1990 it was decided. In view of the facts uncovered during the main cleaning and continuing inspection of the underfire system that the entire underfire system beginning with the fuel gas main was due for replacement and or replaced. Money was appropriated to change the gas main (the most critical repair required) and plans were made to continue by.~~

Plans & methodology were laid out to ~~change~~ replace the fuel gas main, emergency coxos, connecting pipework,



reversing cochs - inner and outer headers, surfaces and metering pens - Essentially all the gas delivery piping - Having to meet production requirements and with limited funding it was decided to spread this reconditioning over the next several years - Due to its condition and key positioning the fuel gas main, lower connecting nipples and emergency cochs were slated first.

Mains were scheduled for replacement one battery at a time with eight - eight four production outages scheduled for each battery - ~~It was decided that in~~ order to preserve production outages were limited to a strict 8 hour maximum -

This was made possible by converting the 10 in diameter decarbonizing air main into fuel gas service - The air main was cleaned, rubber connecting hoses removed and replaced by stainless steel ball valves - <sup>with stainless</sup> Braided

The air main was blindflanked on the <sup>flexible</sup> hose blower inlet side. A 10 inch air actuated COG regulation valve was installed and an attention from the COG preheaters was fabricated and installed - In order to avoid any necessary changes to the reversing linkage - we chose to connect the ten inch main directly to the bottom of the



Reversing Cocks which essentially transferred the weight and stresses of the reversing cocks and linkage to the battery support columns - Air for flue decarbonization was provided by natural air draft thru the reversing Cock clean out ports -

Our strict safe work permit policy prohibits the use of any spark generating implements in the underfire basement while the underfire main is energized with coke oven gas. Therefore each outage required the purging of COG from the preheater and fuel gas mains prior to the beginning of work on any given outage.

CO<sub>2</sub> was the selected purge medium - On the first initial outage, the reversing cocks were cut from the 24in main and connected to the 10inch decarb main now set up for gas usage - The ten inch fabricated header ~~for~~ and a 10" COG regulator were connected to the preheater - Reversing Cocks via the previously mentioned stainless braided hoses were connected to the 10" main - Unfortunately enforcing a strict 8 hour limit outage only allowed enough time for only 1/2 of the reversing Cocks to be connected to the ten inch main -



(5)

Because of the location of the emergency cocks it was possible to energize both the 10" main and 24" main with CO<sub>6</sub> and resume operations.

Each main had its own regulator - Pressure in the 24" main was regulated at 50 mm water column - The ten inch main was regulated at 500 mm. Although flow meters were at this point inaccurate a 100 oven pushing schedule - (24 hours coke) was maintained at a battery average of 2260° F.

Prior to the next scheduled outage mechanical pipe cutters were utilized to cut the remaining 50 cocks away from the 24 in main - Once all the Cocks were being supplied by the 10" main

CO<sub>6</sub> pressure in the main was adjusted to 500 mm. water column - In order to insure equal pressure in each header - CO<sub>6</sub> header pressure was set by adjusting the ball valves previously installed - Each individual header was set at 40-45 mm water column -

The next outage after purge of both 24" and 10" mains demolition of the 24" main was begun - Pneumatic saws were utilized to cut the main into 13 ft sections. 13 ft was the maximum length



which could be maneuvered out of the basement due to space limitations created by the structural support columns of the battery. It was also necessary to remove a section of the wall between the ~~battery~~ basement and the combustion air tunnel. 13 ft sections of the main were placed on dollies and rolled into the air tunnel and ~~put~~ rolled out between structural columns -

New main sections were fabricated in 13 ft lengths and installed in the reverse manner -

This new 24" OD main was constructed of extra strength ASTM A53 steel pipe pre treated with an epoxy coating.

On succeeding <sup>outlets</sup> each new section was fitted into position and welded into place - Entire external circumference was welded with the bottom inside circumference receiving an additional weld - Welded areas were cleaned primed and recoated with 20 mils of the same epoxy coating

STEELCOTE  
EPOXY LINE  
16cf

The new main incorporated several important design changes - 13 clean out ports were located on the upper circumference of each main - Each port measures 14" x 20" spaced 14 feet apart - An Expansion type slip joint with compression packing was installed in the center of the main -



(7)

The main was sealed on a sheet of Teflon with the intent to minimize pipe friction loss incurred by expansion and contraction of the gas piping -

Once intact <sup>the</sup> mains were purged and the existing headers were reconnected to the new 24" main -

In late 1992 - After 16 total eight hour outages the new mains were available for full service -

Prior to proceeding with Phase 2 of header replacement in order to gain useful direction we selected to perform ultrasonic metal thickness readings on the 3" inner and outer headers - Base 1957 data was compared with ~~th~~ our last full survey in 1989. It was felt that promulgation and implementation of the Benzene Neahop in 1991 ~~who~~ would have had an accelerated effect on corrosive pipe loss -

1993 Ultrasonic testing did not bear this out - With the exception of the extreme battery ends - Corrosive rate <sup>loss</sup> from 1989-1993 was found to almost equal to corrosive loss measured from 1957 to 1989 or around 1.84 mils per year - (TABLE 1)



(8)

It was decided that only areas exhibiting extreme corrosion which were listed as P1 or P2 priority would be replaced - yearly ultrasonic readings were to be taken to ensure that corrosive loss did not ~~cause~~ jeopardize safety or plant operation -

24 inner headers and 26 outer headers were changed between late 93 and mid 94 -

Prefabricated 2 piece <sup>3"</sup> headers were moved into the battery basement underfire area - Required outages were taken - mains purged and the 2 piece headers were welded together - Mains were restored to gas service and individual headers were replaced via isolation at the wall emergency cock - <sup>Remount</sup> Orifices were installed as the headers were replaced -

A follow up ultrasonic survey conducted in late 1994 however reflected the accelerated wide spread corrosive pipe loss which had previously been anticipated -

Being .190 thickness as minimum ASTM Spec vs original .216" of virgin Schedule 40 indicated that the majority of headers were requiring replacement.



(9)

Phase 2 was swung into full implementation. 2 piece headers were again prefabricated. Pieces were assembled in the underground basement. (Shut downs were taken - (It was possible to weld enough headers during a shut down to replace ~~20~~<sup>13</sup> inner/outer headers each time - IT WAS ALSO DURING THIS TIME THAT DIFFICULTY WAS ENCOUNTERED AT THE REVERSING CORE CORE AXES - LUBRICATING GREASES WERE ~~SEEN TO~~ SEEMINGLY SUFFERING FROM premature solidification - which from time to time would produce a caricature "pop" - # As equally as important cores were sustaining premature wear and scoring further adding to the degradation of a good seal at this point - ~~in the~~ ~~of~~ ~~the~~ - AS we progressed with header replacement it also ~~became~~ became procedure to replace reversing coaks, headers and orifices in unison - #

→ Finally in late Nov. 1995 - ALL ORIGINAL <sup>1957 installation</sup> UNDERFILE PIPING, REVERSING CORES HEADERS & CROSS NIPPLES AND ORIFACES HAD BEEN REPLACED - Essentially at the end of 1995 we thought we could safely assume that since the original piping had survived 30+ years we could reasonably expect that this new piping to last well into



(10)

the 19th Century.

Unfortunately ultrasonic testing conducted in Oct/Nov 1996 did not hold this to be true - Apparently the Avg. Corrosion rate has accelerated to @ 2.6 mils per year an increase of @ 40% - TABLE 2

In several localized areas it has already (as early as Jan. 1997) forced us to replace some headers which were installed in late 1993 -

Several modifications have been implemented since the undertaking of the underfire pipe replacement program -

Inspection of the fuel gas main in mid 1996 found the underfire main to be in exceptional condition although it was required to remove spot deposits - Mainly at the junction of horizontal and vertical 24" main runs - (The inspection port modification did allow us to thoroughly inspect the main) <sup>easily</sup>

We have conducted experimentation with a synthetic silicon based lubricant for use in the reversing cock cores -

As of this date #1 battery is currently being greased with this synthetic - with excellent resistance to chemical attack



which has drastically reduced the requirement to strip cores - clean & regrease then reinstall -

Gas header fabrication has been modified to provide 3" flanged connections which has eliminated the need to weld 2 pieces on site and thereby eliminate production outages to replace headers -

Basically - having the apparatus to deliver gas is only <sup>A part of</sup> the requirement - in order to maintain production requirements, meeting all environmental constraints and producing a quality product also requires an intensive inspection - corrective action plan to maintain not only the gas delivery system but the flue chambers and ~~draft~~ drafting passages as well - Essentially the problem is to maintain efficient combustion in the flue chamber - ensure even distribution throughout the coking chamber and ~~eliminate~~ ~~start~~ ~~problems~~ -

Acme has always had a rigorous slate of preventative "housekeeping" maintenance practices for the heating department -  
(\*) chart (1) overhead } work instruction CPWC 013

As seen from our work instruction manual the heater has the responsibility to take flue temp readings each shift -  
#5's and #11's - as well as 4 complete



Crosswalks each shift - (2 each battery)

Ovens are observed as pushed to FO any cool spots which may indicate heating corrective action is required - At least 5 random pushes per battery are observed each turn -

Weekly work activity reports are an important part of the heater's responsibility - These reports are filled in on a daily basis

(Chart 2) Heater/Hlpr weekly work requirements  
for review by the heating manager - Duties are in some cases daily specific - but most are subject to the heater's ~~and~~ discretion as long as the weekly work requirement is met - The only allowable exceptions to routine housekeeping chores are when and

(Chart 3) Heater/Hlpr weekly checklist  
if a problem has been identified. Then corrective action may take the place of routine maintenance on a turn - If this occurs - heaters are sometimes required to perform 2 days <sup>housekeeping</sup> activities in one shift -

~~While the housekeeping activities are done pretty frequently~~

This program has historically been adequate enough to meet most requirements - Crosswalk heat distribution is excellent. The adequacy of snow clearing & maintenance programs are verified by an acceptable oven to oven heating - End flies receive special